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Abstract: 
This paper introduces adaptive learning and endogenous indexation in the New-Keynesian 
Phillips curve and studies disinflation under inflation targeting policies. The analysis is 
motivated by the disinflation performance of many inflation-targeting countries, in particular 
the gradual Chilean disinflation with temporary annual targets. At the start of the disinflation 
episode price-setting firms’ expect inflation to be highly persistent and opt for backward-
looking indexation. As the central bank acts to bring inflation under control, price-setting 
firms revise their estimates of the degree of persistence. Such adaptive learning lowers the 
cost of disinflation. This reduction can be exploited by a gradual approach to disinflation. 
Firms that choose the rate for indexation also re-assess the likelihood that announced inflation 
targets determine steady-state inflation and adjust indexation of contracts accordingly. A 
strategy of announcing and pursuing short-term targets for inflation is found to influence the 
likelihood that firms switch from backward-looking indexation to the central bank’s targets. 
As firms abandon backward-looking indexation the costs of disinflation decline further. We 
show that an inflation targeting strategy that employs temporary targets can benefit from 
lower disinflation costs due to the reduction in backward-looking indexation. 
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Developing a better understanding of the costs of disinﬂation has long been an important objec-
tive for macroeconomic research. Since the 1980s disinﬂation episodes and strategies have been
studied extensively under the assumption of rational expectations. This assumption implies that
central bank announcements regarding future policy plans can help achieve disinﬂation at little or
no cost in terms of lost output in spite of the presence of price level rigidity. Many researchers
consider this prediction too optimistic in light of historical experience. Thus, most models used
for policy analysis today combine the rational expectations assumption with additional frictions
that increase the cost of disinﬂation such as, for example, exogenous backward-looking indexation
of wages and producer prices.
The success of many inﬂation-targeting countries in lowering inﬂation in the 1990s provides
a new set of case studies that can improve our understanding of inﬂation-output tradeoffs and
serve as a testing ground for macroeconomic modeling. On this basis, we can evaluate departures
from the benchmark New-Keynesian model with rational expectations and exogenous indexation
and investigate the desirability of alternative policy strategies. Chile, which was only the second
country to adopt inﬂation targeting in 1990, constitutes a particularly interesting example as an
increasing number of developing economies opt for inﬂation targeting. The Chilean disinﬂation
stands out as a very gradual disinﬂation achieved with temporary annual inﬂation targets.
In light of the Chilean experience this paper examines the implications of two departures
from the benchmark New-Keynesian model. First, we follow the recent literature on adaptive
learning and replace the assumption of rational expectations with recursive least squares learning.
Second, we introduce endogenous indexation by allowing ﬁrms to choose between backward-
looking indexation and the central bank’s announced target. At the start of the disinﬂation episode
indexation is complete and price-setters expect highly persistent inﬂation. As price-setting ﬁrms
learn over time they re-assess the likelihood of announced inﬂation targets and adjust indexation
of contracts accordingly.
The ﬁndings in this paper indicate that learning and endogenous indexation may reduce the
costs of disinﬂation. A gradual disinﬂation approach can take advantage of these favorable dy-
namics and achieve the long-run target at lower output costs. An interesting new result is the
ﬁnding that announcing and meeting annual targets for inﬂation achieves lower disinﬂation costs
relative to the announcement of a long-run inﬂation target that will only be met after many years
of gradual disinﬂation. We conﬁrm that the actual targets announced by the Central Bank of Chile
during the disinﬂation from 1990 and 2001 induce favorable learning and indexation dynamics in
our model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shortly summarizes several aspects of the Chilean
disinﬂation and therelated literature. Section 3compares traditional viewswiththe New-Keynesian
approach to understanding the costs of disinﬂation. In section 4, we introduce adaptive learning
1and endogenous indexation in the New-Keynesian model. Section 5 contrasts immediate to grad-
ual disinﬂation strategies. In section we 6 we formulate different sequences of annual inﬂation
targets and evaluate their performance in implementing disinﬂation. In section 7 we shortly dis-
cuss possible approaches to designing dynamically optimal policy while section 8 concludes.
2 Inﬂation targeting and disinﬂation: Chile 1991-2007
Inﬂation targeting started with public announcements of inﬂation targets in New Zealand and Chile
in 1990. Since then, this monetary policy strategy has been implemented in many economies
around the world. Among these economies are developed countries such as the United Kingdom,
Canada, Sweden, Norway or Australia as well as an increasing number of developing countries.
Many of these developing countries have been able to reduce inﬂation rates substantially following
the adoption of inﬂation targeting and seem to have succeeded in stabilizing inﬂation at low to
moderate rates. Fraga et al. (2003), Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), Corbo et al. (2002)
and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) provide empirical assessments of the performance of
inﬂation targeting in a large number of diverse economies.
Given the increasing popularity of inﬂation targeting in developing countries, any lessons for
policy makers that can be derived from Chile’s experience are particularly useful. The Chilean
disinﬂation stands out as a very gradual disinﬂation. The central bank’s ﬁrst ofﬁcial target was
publicly announced in September 1990. It was set for a range of 15 to 20 % for the rate of annual
CPI inﬂation between December 1990 and December 1991. From 1991 to 1999 inﬂation target
ranges and point targets were set on an annual basis for the following calendar year. Figure 1
reports the inﬂation targets (shaded zones in light blue) along with actual inﬂation (dark blue line).
Initially, many observers were sceptical regarding the importance of the Chilean central bank’s
strategic framework in achieving disinﬂation. They attributed much of the improvement to good
luck in form of exogenous developments concerning the exchange rate and raw material prices.
Calvo and Mendoza (1999), for example, wrote: ” ... factors other than stabilization policies have
played an important role in Chilean economic performance, and the dynamics exhibited by key
macroeconomic aggregates can be interpreted in part as an endogenous process of adjustment
triggered by exogenous shocks.” However, the amazing success of the Central Bank of Chile in
meeting its annual inﬂation targets during the disinﬂation phase from 1990 to 2001 and its con-
tinued ability to keep inﬂation close to or within the target zone of 2 to 4 percent suggest that its
strategic framework played an important role.
Aguirre and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005) argue that the short-term annual targets announced dur-
ing the disinﬂation phase were observationally equivalent to hard policy targets in full-ﬂedged
inﬂation targeting regimes. They provide some evidence in favor of this view. In spite of low
initial policy credibility and widespread backward-looking price indexation in goods, labor, and
2Figure 1: Inﬂation Targets and Actual Inﬂation in Chile, 1985-2007
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Note: This ﬁgure extends Figure 1 in Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) with data up to 2007 and has
kindly been provided by Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Gustavo Leyva and Fabian Gredig from the Central Bank
of Chile.
ﬁnancial markets, disinﬂation was achieved at relatively low costs in terms of associated output
losses. Aguirre and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005) suggest that the central bank was able to overcome the
consequences of backward-looking price indexation and related inﬂation inertia, and to inﬂuence
private-sector inﬂation expectations, by pursuing a forward-looking inﬂation target that served as
an explicit nominal anchor. Along these lines, Corbo et al (2003) draw three main lessons from
Chile’s experience that should be of interest to other developing countries:
”First, initial progress in reducing inﬂation toward the target was slow as the public
was learning about the Central Bank’s true commitment to attaining the target.
Second, the gradual phasing in of inﬂation targeting contributed to declining inﬂation
by lowering inﬂation expectations and changing wage and price dynamics.
Third, with respect to the speed of inﬂation reduction, a cold-turkey approach would
have resulted in a larger sacriﬁce ratio stemming from higher unemployment during
the early years of inﬂation targeting, when credibility was gradually being built up.”
These conclusions suggest that learning by price-setting ﬁrms and changes in the degree of back-
ward-looking indexation regarding wages and producer prices played an important role in shaping
3the costs of disinﬂation in Chile.1
More recently, researchers have developed and estimated sophisticated New-Keynesian dy-
namic general equilibrium models for policy analysis in Chile (cf. Caputo et al (2007), Caputo
et al (2006), DeGregorio and Parrado (2006) and Cespedes et al (2005)). These models share
the assumptions of rational expectations and exogenous backward-looking indexation with similar
models developed for industrialized economies (cf. Christiano et al. (2005)). The New-Keynesian
Phillips curve embedded in these models, however, does not seem to be stable. For example,
Cespedes et al (2005) report evidence of structural change during the late 1990s. This change
is exhibited in a higher weight of expected future inﬂation - and a correspondingly lower weight
of lagged inﬂation - when producers set their prices. For a sample from 1990 to 2000 they esti-
mate a degree of backward-looking indexation around 0.85, essentially indistinguishable from the
limiting case of complete indexation. With the sample extended to 2005, however, the degree of
indexation declines to around 0.66.
In the remainder of this paper, we explore departures from the standard New-Keynesian model
by allowing for adaptive learning and endogenous indexation. We investigate whether the partic-
ular choice of inﬂation targeting strategy may inﬂuence the costs of disinﬂation by increasing the
speed of learning and reducing the degree of backward-looking indexation.
3 Disinﬂation and the New-Keynesian Phillips curve
A traditional perspective on disinﬂation
It is conventional wisdom among central bankers that conducting monetary policy so as to
keep inﬂation constant at all times will induce ﬂuctuations in aggregate real output. Historical
experience such as the 1980s Volcker disinﬂation in the United States suggests that a permanent
reduction in the rate of inﬂation cannot be achieved without a temporary decline of output below
the economy’s potential. Such a cost of disinﬂation is embedded in the traditional accelerationist
Phillips curve:
pt = pt−1+lxt (1)
Here, pt denotes the rate of inﬂation and xt the output gap, that is the deviation of actual output
from the economy’s potential.
A simple experiment serves to illustrate the cost of disinﬂation. Assume that inﬂation in period
t = 1 is equal to 1 percent and that the central bank aims to achieve price stability, i.e. an inﬂation
rate of zero percent, in period t = 2. Such a reduction in the rate of inﬂation requires a negative
output gap of −1/l percent in period t = 1. In the absence of any future shocks that might push
inﬂation up or down, inﬂation could then be held at zero from period 2 onwards by keeping the
1See also Herrera (2002) and Lefort and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002).
4output gap closed. Thus, the cumulative output loss in absolute terms that is required to achieve a
reduction in inﬂation of 1 percent point corresponds to 1/l percent of total output.
In central bank circles the cumulative output loss associated with a permanent reduction of the
inﬂation rate by one percent is often referred to as the sacriﬁce ratio. If equation (1), the accelera-
tionist Phillips curve is treated as a structural relationship the associated sacriﬁce ratio is constant
at 1/l and invariant to policy design. In other words, no particular strategy or announcement by
the central bank could help in changing the trade-off between output and inﬂation or in reducing
the cumulative output cost of a disinﬂation. Nevertheless, a central bank that cares about stabiliz-
ing output and inﬂation would always opt for disinﬂating gradually and spreading the output loss
over time.
The New-Keynesian perspective on disinﬂation
The traditional Phillips curve shown above lacks microeconomic foundations. Fortunately, the
New-Keynesian paradigm offers an alternative model of inﬂation that is consistent with optimizing
behavior and rational expectations formation by households and ﬁrms. However, the basic version
of the New-Keynesian model has a very controversial property. In this model the macroeconomic
policy goals of stabilizing output and inﬂation do not come into conﬂict with each other (cf. Walsh
(2003), Woodford (2003)). This property is often referred to as the ”divine coincidence”. It
implies that disinﬂation can be achieved without any reduction in aggregate output. It is somewhat
surprising that a model that incorporates long-lasting nominal rigidities exhibits such a property.
To understand its origins it is helpful to reiterate the elements of the model that drive price-setting
and inﬂation dynamics.
The model is populated by a continuum of monopolistic ﬁrms that produce differentiated
goods. Importantly, these ﬁrms cannot adjust product prices freely in every period. The basic
version of the model relies on the mathematically convenient mechanism for modeling price ridig-
ity due to Calvo (1983). It implies that ﬁrms have to wait for a signal to adjust prices. They
receive such a signal with probability 1−q. Every ﬁrm that receives a price-setting signal solves
a dynamic optimization problem to set its price optimally taking into account the probabilistic
constraint on future price-setting opportunities. A ﬁrm j that does not receive a price-setting sig-
nal leave its price unchanged at the zero inﬂation steady state. Alternatively, if the steady-state
rate of inﬂation, pS, differs from zero, ﬁrm j lets its price grow with that steady-state rate, i.e.
Pj,t = (1+pS)Pj,t−1. In other words, ﬁrms that are not allowed to re-optimize their price instead
are assumed to index to steady-state inﬂation. In solving their optimization problem ﬁrms are
assumed to form rational, model-consistent expectations.
Auseful feature ofthis model is that it can besolved without explicitly tracking the distribution
of prices across ﬁrms. Aggregation and log-linear approximation deliver a well-known, simple
5relationship between inﬂation, expected future inﬂation and the output gap - the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve:
(pt −pS) = bEt[(pt+1−pS)]+lxt (2)
Here, the output gap xt denotes the difference between actual output and the level of output that
would be achieved if prices were ﬂexible. The parameter b refers to the discount factor. The slope
parameter l is a function of q and b.2
Again, a simple experiment serves to assess the cost of disinﬂation. Suppose the central bank
enters period t = 1 with an inﬂation target, p∗, equal to 1 percent. Since equation (3) is linear, the
steady-state rate of inﬂation must be equal to the central bank’s target, pS = p∗. In period t = 2
the central bank announces a new target rate of zero percent inﬂation. Market participants would
immediately incorporate the new target in their expectations for period t = 3. It would imply
zero inﬂation in steady state. As a result, inﬂation in period t = 2 immediately drops to the new
target rate. No reduction in the output gap, xt, is required to achieve this outcome. Disinﬂation is
costless. It is achieved by inﬂuencing market participants’ expectations.
The model’s implication of costless disinﬂation stands in contrast to historical experience.
For this reason, researchers who have estimated New-Keynesian models using data from leading
industrial economies have typically assumed an additional source of price rigidity. One possible
approach is to introduce ﬁrms that apply a simple rule-of-thumb in price setting as in Gali and
Gertler (1999). An alternative approach assumes that some ﬁrms index prices to past inﬂation in
those periods when they cannot adjust prices optimally (Christiano et al. (2001, 2005)).
By now backward-looking indexation has become a popular assumption embedded in many
empirically estimated DSGEmodels used for monetary policy analysis. Firms that do not receive a
Calvo-style signal to adjust prices in the current period are assumed to implement instead a pricing
rule based on past inﬂation, i.e. Pj,t = (1+pt−1)Pj,t−1. The share of ﬁrms that use backward-
looking indexation, denoted by k in the following, is treated as exogenous. Consequently, the
log-linear approximation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve takes the following form:
pt −(kpt−1+(1−k)pS) = bEt[(pt+1−(kpt +(1−k)pS))]+lxt (3)
Solving for the current inﬂation rate one ﬁnds that it depends on a weighted average of past and
expected future inﬂation. The weight is a function of the share of ﬁrms that implement backward-
looking indexation:
pt =
k
1+bk
pt−1+
b
1+bk
Et[pt+1]+
l
1+bk
xt +
(1−k)(1−b)
1+bk
pS (4)
2To be precise, the baseline version of the model (cf. Walsh (2003)) implies that l is determined as follows:
l = (1−q)(1−bq)q−1(s+j). s−1 and j represent the constant intertemporal elasticity of consumption and labor
supply elasticity, respectively.
6It is useful to note that in the limiting case of complete indexation, k = 1, the inﬂation equation
simpliﬁes to
pt =
1
1+b
pt−1+
b
1+b
Et[pt+1]+
l
1+b
xt (5)
Interestingly, with complete indexation the current inﬂation rate is independent of steady-state
inﬂation pS.
Equation (4) has been estimated for many countries. Estimates for Chile have been obtained
by Cespedes et al. (2005), Caputo et al. (2006) and Caputo et al. (2007). Cespedes et al (2005)
took care to account for time-variation in the inﬂation target. In this case, the last term in equation
(4) is modiﬁed to (1− k)(1+bk)−1(p∗
t − bp∗
t+1). They report evidence of structural change.
For a sample from 1990 to 2000 they estimate a degree of backward-looking indexation around
0.85, essentially indistinguishable from the limiting case of complete indexation. With the sample
extended to 2005, however, the degree of indexation declines to around 0.66.
In this paper, we relax two important assumptions of the standard model - the assumption of
rational expectations and the assumption of exogenous backward-looking indexation. Relaxing
these assumptions is important because of the empirical evidence regarding changes in the degree
of inﬂation persistence during and following the disinﬂation in Chile. The reduction in inﬂation
persistence may well be due to changes in price setters’ beliefs or to changes in the degree of
backward-looking indexation. Thus, we depart from the assumption of rational expectations by
considering adaptive learning. In doing so we follow the lead of Marcet and Sargent (1987), Evans
and Honkapohja (2001), Orphanides and Williams (2005, 2006) and Gaspar et al. (2005, 2006).
Furthermore, we innovate by rendering the share of ﬁrms that implement backward-looking in-
dexation endogenous. In particular, we allow ﬁrms to choose between the central bank’s inﬂation
target and past inﬂation as possible indices. This choice of index is made according to the likeli-
hood that the chosen index better matches the mean of the observed inﬂation distribution. Thus,
ﬁrms aim to choose the index that seems a better estimate of steady-state inﬂation.
4 Adaptive learning and endogenous indexation
Introducing adaptive learning
As shown above expectations play a key role in determining inﬂation dynamics. Since the
1980s research on monetary policy has relied on the assumption of rational expectations and ex-
plored its implications for policy design. A drawback of the assumption of rational expectations
is that it imputes an unrealistic extent of knowledge to market participants. An interesting alterna-
tive approach is given by adaptive or least-squares learning. This approach assumes that economic
agents behave like econometricians in forming expectations and estimate reduced-form inﬂation
equations. Under certain assumptions adaptive learning may converge to rational expectations in
7the long-run.
Followingthe inﬂuential contribution ofEvansandHonkapohja (2001) Orphanides andWilliams
(2005, 2006) and Gaspar et al. (2005, 2006) have studied monetary policy design with price-
setting ﬁrms that form expectations about future inﬂation in a least-squares fashion. Motivated
by this line of research, we assume that price-setting ﬁrms estimate the following regression for
inﬂation:
pt = gtpt−1+et (6)
The parameter gt carries a time subscript to allow for episodes with high and low degrees of
inﬂation persistence. We make this assumption because our model will endogenously generate
a time-varying degree of inﬂation persistence. Incorporating this time variation in price setters’
perceived inﬂation equation ensures that expectations formation is consistent with equilibrium
outcomes. Recursive estimation then implies the following updating equations for theprice setters’
point estimate of the inﬂation persistence parameter, ct, and its variance, St:
ct = ct−1+St−1pt−1F−1(pt −ct−1pt−1)
St = St−1−St−1XtF−1X′
tSt−1+sg (7)
where F = XtSt−1X′
t +se
For a derivation of these updating equations using the Kalman ﬁlter see Harvey (1992). Further-
more, the updating equations are consistent with Bayes rule under the assumption of normally
distributed shocks and beliefs (see Zellner (1971)). It is typical for the adaptive learning literature
that researchers choose from a variety of learning speciﬁcations. Branch and Evans (2006) provide
a useful exposition of alternative approaches and investigate how well they ﬁt survey expectations.
Given equations (6) and (7) the price setters’ expectation of future inﬂation under least-squares
learning, ELS
t [pt+1], corresponds to:
ELS
t [pt+1] = ct−1pt. (8)
Here, we follow Gaspar et al. (2006) in assuming that ELS
t [pt+1] is based on the estimate ct−1
that does not yet incorporate the most recent inﬂation observation pt.3 Using equation (8) to
substitute out expected future inﬂation in equation (4) one obtains the following reduced-form
inﬂation equation:
pt =
k
1+b(k−ct−1)
pt−1+
l
1+b(k−ct−1)
xt +
(1−k)(1−b)
1+b(k−ct−1)
pS (9)
3Alternatively, one could either use only lagged information, i.e. ELS
t [pt+1] = c2
t−1pt−1 or incorporate current
inﬂation in the estimate of the persistence parameter, ELS
t [pt+1] = ctpt. The latter speciﬁcation would require solving a
more complicated ﬁxed point problem.
8Adaptive learning in form of the time-varying estimate, ct−1, inﬂuences the observed degree of
inﬂation persistence. In addition, the degree of persistence depends on central bank policy.
Introducing endogenous indexation
So far, the degree of backward-looking indexation, k, has been treated as constant and ex-
ogenous. A novel contribution of this paper is to allow for an endogenous determination of a
time-varying share of ﬁrms that apply backward-looking indexation. We assume that ﬁrms would
like to pick an index that is a good estimate of steady-state inﬂation. They have two options.
One option is the central bank’s announced inﬂation target, p∗. If the central bank delivers on its
promise, then steady-state inﬂation will be equal to the target. The other option is the most recent
observation of inﬂation, pt−1. If the central bank does not aim to control inﬂation, the inﬂation
rate will follow a random walk and past inﬂation will be the best estimate of future inﬂation.
Every time ﬁrms obtain a new observation on inﬂation, they investigate whether the tar-
get or past inﬂation better matches the mean of the observed inﬂation distribution. We use
st = Prob(pS = p∗) to denote the probability that the announced inﬂation target corresponds to
the mean of the observed inﬂation distribution. When a new observation becomes available, st is
updated as follows:
st+1 =
ste(−0.5(pt−p∗)2)
ste(−0.5(pt−p∗))2 +(1−st)e(−0.5(pt−pt−1))2 (10)
This updating equation is consistent with Bayes rule given normal shocks and beliefs.4
Firmscannot switch indices atall times. Theyare allowed to makeachoice regarding theindex
at the same time as they receive a Calvo-style signal that allows them to adjust their current price
optimally. The probability of such a signal is 1−q. A ﬁrm that has received such a signal will then
consider whether to switch the index that will apply to its pricing rule in the periods without Calvo
signals. One possibility would be to assume that ﬁrms switch from backward-looking indexation
to the central bank’s target as soon as the probability st has moved above 0.5 and switch back if this
probability falls slightly below 0.5. Such an assumption would seem reasonable in the unlikely
case that the index can be switched at zero cost.
Instead, we assume that ﬁrms only choose to switch the index when there is overwhelming
evidence in favor of such a change. Speciﬁcally, we introduce a trigger probability ¯ S. If the ﬁrm’s
current choice of index is pt−1, it will switch to p∗ once st exceeds ¯ S. Similarly, if the current
choice of indexation rate is p∗, the ﬁrm will switch back to pt−1 if (1−st) , the probability of
pt−1, exceeds the same trigger value. We note that all ﬁrms face the same information regarding
inﬂation. Thus, st is symmetric across ﬁrms. Since the probability of a Calvo signal is 1−q, a
share of 1−qﬁrmsswitches the rate of indexation at any point in time given there is overwhelming
4See Wieland (2000).
9evidence in favor of such a shift.
Finally, the degree of indexation kt is allowed to vary between complete indexation, i.e. kt =1,
and a minimal value of k, i.e. kt ∈ [k,1].5 Thus, kt is governed by the following process:
kt =

      
      
qkt−1 if st > ¯ S and kt ≥ k
1−q(1−kt−1) if (1−st) > ¯ S
kt−1 else
(11)
Every period in which st exceeds the trigger probability, a share of 1−q ﬁrms switches from
backward-looking indexation to the central bank’s target, while a share of q ﬁrms sticks with the
past inﬂation rate.
Since the share of ﬁrms using backward-looking indexation varies over time, the reduced-form
inﬂation equation (9) needs to be re-written as follows:
pt =
kt−1
1+b(kt−1−ct−1)
pt−1+
l
1+b(kt−1−ct−1)
xt +
(1−kt−1)(1−b)
1+b(kt−1−ct−1)
pS (12)
As a short-hand we will denote the time-varying, reduced-form parameters by d(1,2,3),t. Accord-
ingly, the reduced-form inﬂation equation may be written as:
pt = d1,tpt−1+d2,txt +d3,t (13)
To be able to study disinﬂation under alternative targeting strategies we still need to describe
the central bank’s objectives and the determination of the output gap xt.
5 Inﬂation targeting: Immediate versus gradual disinﬂation
Central bank objectives and policy
A central bank that has adopted an inﬂation targeting strategy is typically assumed to pursue a
policy that minimizes the following per-period loss function:
l(pt,xt) = (pt −p∗)2+ax2
t (14)
The parameter a refers to the central bank’s relative preference for stabilizing output versus inﬂa-
5Wemaintainaminimal amount of exogenous indexation toensure that lagged inﬂationremainsa determinant of the
equilibrium inﬂation process under rational expectations. As a result, the learning model uses the correct reduced-form
inﬂation equation under rational expectations.
10tion.
To keep the technical analysis manageable we make two simplifying assumptions. First, the
central bank directly controls the output gap, xt. Second, it observes the key parameters of the
inﬂation equation as well as the price setters’ beliefs regarding inﬂation persistence, ct−1. Thus,
the central bank can take into account the parameters d(1,2,3),t of equation (13) in designing its
policy. However, we refrain from letting the central bank exploit the dynamic learning process
of the price-setters in conducting policy.6 Under these assumptions the central bank’s dynamic
optimization problem corresponds to:
Min
xt
Et
 
¥
å
t=1
bt−1(pt −p∗)2+ax2
t
 
(15)
s.t. pt = d1,tpt−1+d2,txt +d3,t
As a start we consider the extreme cases of strict inﬂation targeting, a = 0, and strict out-
put stabilization, a → ¥. Strict output stabilization would imply that the central bank always
aims to set the output gap, xt, equal to zero. Consequently, the dynamics of inﬂation would be
governed exclusively by the time-varying parameter d1,t, which depends in turn on the degree of
backward-looking indexation and the price setters’ beliefs regarding inﬂation persistence. If d1,t
ever exceeded unity, inﬂation would spiral out of control.
In contrast, strict inﬂation targeting would ensure that the inﬂation target is met at all times for
any perceived degree of inﬂation persistence. The resulting output gap policy corresponds to:
xt = −d4,t(d1,tpt−1+d3,t −p∗) (16)
with d4,t = d−1
2,t . Note, with a zero inﬂation target, d3,t would also be equal to zero.
Next, we consider the intermediate case with a positive but not inﬁnite. Such central bank
preferences are often referred to as ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. Under this policy the output gap
falls in between the two extremes implied by strict inﬂation targeting and strict output stabilization,
i.e. 0 < d4,t < d−1
2,t . Orphanides and Wieland (2000) provide an analytical formula for the case of
d1,t = 1. Dynamically optimal policies for alternative values of d1,t may be computed numerically
with the algorithm provided along with that paper.7
Model parameterization and initial conditions
6We will discuss such an ambitious proposal in the last section of the paper. Gaspar et al. (2006) refer to a central
bank with this capability as ”sophisticated”.
7The matlab code is available from www.volkerwieland.com.
11Having speciﬁed a very stylized but complete macroeconomic model we can proceed to eval-
uate alternative disinﬂation strategies. Initial conditions for the disinﬂation are deﬁned as follows:
(i) initial inﬂation is set at 20 percent, p = 0.2, similar to the average inﬂation rate of Chile prior
to the start of inﬂation targeting; (ii) initially all ﬁrms implement backward-looking indexation,
k0 = 1; and (iii) perceived inﬂation persistence indicates a unit root in inﬂation, i.e. c0 = 1.
Given these initial conditions the reduced-form inﬂation equation (13) simpliﬁes to
pt = pt−1+lxt, (17)
corresponding exactly to equation (1), the accelerationist Phillips curve discussed in section 2. It
follows that these initial conditions represent an equilibrium if policy aims exclusively at stabiliz-
ing output, i.e. x0 = 0. The parameter values used in the subsequent simulations are summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values and initial beliefs
Parameter Value Economic interpretation
b 0.99 Discount factor.
l 0.5 Slope of Phillips curve.
kt k0 = 1 Degree of indexation to t −1 inﬂation.
ct c0 = 1 Price setters initial belief regarding inﬂation persistence.
St S0 = 100 Price setters initial variance.
st s0 = 0.1 Price/index setters initial belief regardingProb(pS =p∗).
p0,p∗ 0.2/0 Initial inﬂation is at 0.2, long-run inﬂation target is 0.
k 0.05 Degree of minimal exogenous indexation.
q 0.5 Probability of no price- or index-adjustment signal.
¯ S 0.8 Trigger probability for switching the rate for indexation.
s 2−4 Variance of noise (added later).
sg 10 Belief regarding variability of g.
Immediate versus gradual disinﬂation
The initial conditions summarized above set the stage for the entry of an independent inﬂation-
targeting central bank.8 This central bank faces very high initial costs of disinﬂation. As a ﬁrst
step, we contrast the immediate disinﬂation approach that would be implemented under strict
inﬂation targeting with a more gradual approach consistent with a positive weight on output in the
central bank’s preferences.
The optimal policy coefﬁcient under strict inﬂation targeting corresponds to the inverse of the
slope of the reduced-form inﬂation equation and equals d4,0 =d−1
2,0 =2. In our model such a policy
8For a fascinating account of the implications of learning for inﬂation and stabilization when money growth and
inﬂation are determined by the government’s budget constraint rather than an independent central bank the reader is
referred to Sargent, Williams and Zha (2007).
12would achieve the inﬂation target of zero percent within one period. However, such an immediate
disinﬂation would result in an output loss of 40 percent in the same period. This outcome is shown
by the solid blue line in Figure 2. In period 5 the central bank introduces a new inﬂation target
of zero percent. The cumulative output loss required to disinﬂate by 20 percentage points is also
realized in period 5. While this approach can be simulated in our simple model such an immense
reduction of total output would not be implementable in practice.
Figure 2: Immediate versus Gradual Disinﬂation
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Inflation Rate: S
t
Immediate
Gradual
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Output Gap: x
t
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Cumulative Output Gap Loss: -6 x
t
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Perceived Inflation Persistence: c
t
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Probability (S
*): s
t
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Degree of Indexation: N
t
Interestingly, the dramatic experience of immediate disinﬂation induces price setters to revise
their estimates of the inﬂation persistence parameter, ct, from 1.0 to about 0.5 (middle-right panel).
Furthermore, the probability st that is initially set at 0.1 jumps to 1.0. In other words, the immedi-
ate reduction in inﬂation convinces ﬁrms that the central bank’s inﬂation target constitutes a better
13estimate of the mean of the inﬂation distribution than the past realization of inﬂation. Thus, from
period 6 onwards the probability st exceeds the trigger value ¯ S (bottom left panel) and ﬁrms that
receive a Calvo signal will abandon backward-looking indexation and instead choose the central
bank’s target as index. Since the probability of such a signal is 1−q, a share of q ﬁrmscontinues to
implement backward-looking indexation. Thus, kt declines over time to the minimum exogenous
degree of indexation, k, (bottom-right panel).
Unfortunately, a strict inﬂation targeting strategy fails to take advantage of the reduction in
the cost of disinﬂation due to the decline in perceived inﬂation persistence and backward-looking
indexation. The reason is simply that the disinﬂation is completed prior to these favorable devel-
opments. Instead, a gradual disinﬂation strategy might be able to proﬁt from such developments
and achieve disinﬂation at lower output costs. A gradual disinﬂation strategy is optimal if central
bank preferences incorporate output stability, i.e. a positive weight a in the loss function, that is
equation (14). In this case, the response parameter d4 in the policy function, equation (20), must
be positive but below d−1
2 .
To simulate a gradual disinﬂation we set d4,t = d2,t/(1+d2
2,t). Initially, the policy response
coefﬁcient d4,t corresponds to 0.4, that is one ﬁfth of the policy response needed to meet the
target immediately. The resulting outcome is depicted by the red dotted line in Figure 2 with
the disinﬂation again starting in period 5. The initial output decline is much smaller but will be
sustained for a much longer time than in the case of immediate disinﬂation. The inﬂation rate
declines gradually. By period 15 inﬂation is within 0.5 percentage points of the long-run target of
zero. Treating a period in this model as a year, such a 10-year disinﬂation is broadly similar to the
Chilean experience between 1991 and 2001.
The cumulative sum of output gap losses is much smaller under the gradual approach than
under strict inﬂation targeting. The cumulative output loss converges to about 26% of annual
output spread over more than 10 years. The reason for the decline in the sacriﬁce ratio from 2 in
the case of strict inﬂation targeting to about 1.3 in the case of gradual disinﬂation is to be found in
adaptive learning. As price-setters observe the fall of the rate of inﬂation they revise their estimate
of inﬂation persistence downwards. This reduction in ct from 1 to about 0.8 adds disinﬂationary
impetus and reduces the costs of disinﬂation. While the decline in perceived inﬂation persistence
is much smaller under gradual than under immediate disinﬂation, the gradual approach can take
advantage of the resulting reduction in disinﬂation costs.
Turning to the degree of backward-looking indexation, we note that ﬁrms see now reason to
switch from backward-looking indexation to the announced inﬂation target. The announced target
is just too far way and progress towards it too slow to change the probability weights on lagged
inﬂation versus the announced target. As a result, endogenous indexation does not come into play
in terms of reducing the costs of disinﬂation under such a gradual disinﬂation strategy.
146 Inﬂation targeting: Temporary inﬂation targets
Two important aspects of the Chilean disinﬂation strategy have been emphasized in section 2 - its
gradual nature and its use of temporary annual inﬂation targets. Having shown that the gradual
approach helps reduce disinﬂation costs by taking advantage of the reduction in perceived inﬂation
persistence we now extend the analysis to consider the effect of announcing temporary targets. In
the Chilean case these temporary targets appear to have been pursued quite vigorously. Thus,
we investigate whether such temporary targets, p∗
t , could have an additional beneﬁcial effect on
learning and the degree of indexation and thereby lower the costs of disinﬂation further.
With temporary targets the New-Keynesian Phillips curve needs to be slightly modiﬁed:
pt =
k
1+bk
pt−1+
b
1+bk
Et[pt+1]+
l
1+bk
xt +
(1−k)
1+bk
(p∗
t −bp∗
t+1) (18)
Accordingly, the reduced-form inﬂation equation with adaptive learning and endogenous indexa-
tion corresponds to:
pt =
kt−1
1+b(kt−1−ct−1)
pt−1+
l
1+b(kt−1−ct−1)
xt
+
(1−kt−1)
1+b(kt−1−ct−1)
(p∗
t −bp∗
t+1) (19)
= d1,tpt−1+d2,txt +d3,t
As a ﬁrst example, we consider a gradual, linear reduction in the inﬂation target by 2 percent-
age points per year. Thus, the long-run target of zero percent inﬂation is reached in year 14, 10
years after the start of disinﬂation. We assume that the central bank pursues these annual targets
as actively as possible. In other words, the central bank implements strict inﬂation targeting with
respect to temporary targets. After deciding on next year’s inﬂation target, the central bank acts in
order to meet this target. Thus, it pursues the following output gap policy:
xt = −d4,t(d1,tpt−1+d3,t −p∗
t ) (20)
with d4,t = d−1
2,t , and d(1,2,3) consistent with equation (19).
The disinﬂation performance with temporary annual targets is shown by the dashed green line
in Figure 3. It is compared to the gradual disinﬂation, that is the dotted red line, shown previously
in Figure 2. In both cases, the parameter governing the perceived degree of inﬂation persistence, c,
declines towards a value of 0.8 (middle-right panel). This decline occurs slightly faster under the
gradual disinﬂation because initially inﬂation is reduced more quickly than the linear reduction
implied by the annual targets.
15Figure 3: Temporary Inﬂation Targets
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An important difference arises with respect to the degree of backward-looking indexation.
By announcing and meeting the temporary annual inﬂation targets the central bank succeeds in
convincing ﬁrms that they are better off by choosing the central bank’s target as an index for the
pricing rule applied in those periods without Calvo-style optimal price-adjustment signals. The
probability st that indicates the likelihood of the central bank’s target(s) representing the mean of
the inﬂation distribution rises quickly (bottom-left panel). It exceeds the trigger probability ¯ S of
0.8 by the second year of the disinﬂation. Every year from then on a share of 1−q of the ﬁrms
that previously applied backward-looking indexation switches to using the central bank’s targets.
As a result the degree of backward-looking indexation declines fairly rapidly and approaches the
minimum level k by year 11.
Compared to the gradual disinﬂation strategy with a long-run target the strategy with tem-
16porary, annual targets allows the central bank to take advantage of the endogenous reduction in
backward-looking indexation. Firms change their behavior because they can already observe dur-
ing the ﬁrst few years of the disinﬂation that the central bank means to achieve its announced
targets. As a result, the output losses associated with disinﬂation are lower with annual targets.
The cumulative output loss, (middle-left panel) converges to 22 percent of output, that is 4 percent
lower than in the case of the gradual disinﬂation. The sacriﬁce ratio is reduced to 1.1. Further sub-
stantial gains in terms of stabilization performance will accrue in the future. Given the substantial
reduction in backward-looking indexation the central bank will be able to reduce variations in
inﬂation in the event of unexpected shocks at much lower cost in terms of output variability.
Next, we consider three alternative parameterizations of the sequence of annual inﬂation tar-
gets: (i) targets that imply accelerating disinﬂation; (ii) targets that imply decelerating disinﬂation;
and (iii) the annual targets set in Chile from 1991 to 2001.
Inthe ﬁrstcase, shown inFigure 4the reduction in the central bank’s annual targets accelerates
over time (dashed green line). Initially, the central bank lowers the inﬂation target by 1 percentage
point per year. Starting in year 9, the ﬁfth year of the disinﬂation, the inﬂation target is lowered by
two percentage points per year. From year 11 onwards the target is lowered by 3 percentage points
per year. The long-run target of zero percent is reached in year 14, after a 10-year long disinﬂation
process. Compared to the disinﬂation with linearly-declining targets, accelerating targets initially
imply a slower decline in inﬂation. The output gap incurred during the disinﬂation increases over
time in absolute value. The total cost of disinﬂation, that is the cumulative output gap, remains
smaller than with the gradual disinﬂation strategy (dotted red line) but larger than with linearly-
declining targets. The cumulative output gap reaches 24 percent relative to the 22 percent with
linearly-declining targets. Due to the slow pace of disinﬂation during the ﬁrst few years, price-
setting ﬁrms take longer to become convinced that they are better off with using the central bank’s
target as an index for their pricing rules in periods without Calvo-style signals. The probability st,
(lower-left panel), rises slowly and takes ﬁve years to exceed the trigger value of 0.8. Only from
year 10 onwards those ﬁrms that receive Calvo signals start switching from backward-looking
indexation to the central bank’s targets.
Figure 5 shows the simulation with decelerating targets. In the ﬁrst year of disinﬂation, year
5, the central bank aims to lower inﬂation by 4 percentage points to 16 percent. In subsequent
years the speed of disinﬂation declines. These annual inﬂation targets (dashed green line) are
set to be identical to the path for inﬂation that is realized under the gradual disinﬂation with a
long-run target (dotted red line). Thus, the actual path of inﬂation (top left panel) coincides under
these two scenarios. This parameterization is particularly interesting because it provides a ceteris-
paribus assessment of the reduction in disinﬂation costs that is achieved by announcing temporary
annual targets. As shown in the top-right panel, the output gap associated with the disinﬂation
with temporary targets (dashed green line) is at all times equal or smaller in absolute value than
17Figure 4: Accelerating Disinﬂation with Temporary Targets
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in the case of the gradual disinﬂation with a long-run target. The total cost of disinﬂation comes
to 20 percent of output, that is another 2 percent lower than with linearly-declining targets. The
sacriﬁce ratio associated with a disinﬂation from 20 percent to zero inﬂation is unity. Announcing
and achieving the reduction of inﬂation by 4 percentage points in the ﬁrst year of the disinﬂation
convinces price-setting ﬁrms that the central bank means business. As a result, the probability st
rises rapidly and ﬁrms soon start to abandon the practice of backward-looking indexation.
The annual targets set by the Chilean central bank between 1991 and 2001 also implied a de-
celerating disinﬂation. In 1990 inﬂation was substantially above 20 percent. Thus, the announced
target for 1990 of 15-20 percent indicated a signiﬁcant reduction with the start of the inﬂation
targeting strategy. Table 2 reports the announced target ranges and point targets (top row) as well
as the mid-points of these ranges (bottom row). From 2001 onwards, the central bank has aimed
18Figure 5: Decelerating Disinﬂation with Temporary Targets
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to keep inﬂation within a target range of 2 to 4 percent.
We have used the midpoints9 of the target ranges from 1991 to 2001 to simulate a disinﬂation
in the New-Keynesian model with adaptive learning and endogenous indexation developed in this
paper. The initial conditions are the same as the preceding simulations shown in Figures 2 to 5.
The midpoints of the Chilean target ranges are implement starting in year 5 till year 15. To render
the cost of disinﬂation incurred by the pursuit of the Chilean targets in our model comparable
to the preceding simulations, we added a further reduction in the inﬂation target. In period 16
the target is reduced by an additional 3 percentage points so as to reach a long-run target of zero
inﬂation.
9We disregard the potential effects of target ranges and refer the reader instead to the analysis of such nonlinearities
in Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
19Figure 6: Chile’s Inﬂation Targets: 1991 - 2001 (Year 5 to 15)
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Note: From 2001 onwards the Central Bank of Chile pursued an inﬂation target zone of 2 to 4 percent
with a midpoint of 3 percent. For comparability with the preceding evaluation of disinﬂation costs we have
added a further 3 percent disinﬂation step in year 16 to achieve a long-run target of zero inﬂation.
20Table 2: Chile’s Inﬂation Targets: 1991-2001
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
in Model 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Range 15-20 13-16 10-12 9-11 8.0 6.5 5.5 4.5 4.3 3.5 2-4
Midpoint 17.5 14.5 11 10 8 6.5 5.5 4.5 4.3 3.5 3
The total cost of disinﬂation in terms of the cumulative output gap loss amounts to 18 percent
of GDP spread over 12 years (middle left panel). The sacriﬁce ratio is 0.9. It is lower than in
the simulation with decelerating targets shown in Figure 5. This reduction is possible for the
following reasons. The initial disinﬂation steps in years 5, 6 and 7 are vigorous enough to reduce
the perceived degree of inﬂation persistence (middle right panel) and to raise the probability st
beyond the trigger level ¯ S. Thus, the degree of backward-looking indexation declines over the
course of the disinﬂation. However, the disinﬂation stretches out for a longer period than in Figure
5 and thereby beneﬁts even more from the reduction in inﬂation persistence and indexation.
The baseline-version of the New-Keynesian model does not include structural shocks in the
inﬂation equation. However, such shocks are often added either to capture the presence of mea-
surement error or to reﬂect missing variables or other sources of rigidity. Thus, we now proceed
to introduce random shocks in the New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
pt =
k
1+bk
pt−1+
b
1+bk
Et[pt+1]+
l
1+bk
xt +
(1−k)
1+bk
(p∗
t −bp∗
t+1)+et (21)
The shocks are denoted by et and normally distributed with zero mean and variance s = 2−4. The
timing of expectations formation, policy actions and shocks is such that the shocks are realized
after time t expectations have been formed and policy has been set. Thus, the shocks introduce
noise in inﬂation that cannot be avoided by contemperaneous policy actions. However, in the
period following the shock the central bank will act to minimize further consequences from these
variations that would occur due to the intrinsic persistence of inﬂation. To this end, the central
bank induces offsetting variations in the output gap.
The ﬂuctuations of inﬂation and output that result from random shocks and subsequent policy
responses have animportant inﬂuence on the dynamics of learning and endogenous indexation. On
theone side, such shocks imply thatthe central bank nevermeets itstarget exactly. Thus, ﬁrmsmay
ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to assess whether it is better to use past inﬂation or the central bank’s target
as an index for their pricing rules in periods without Calvo signals. On the other side, the fact that
the central bank will set policy to counter the consequences of unforeseen shocks to inﬂation will
generate information regarding the degree of inﬂation persistence and induce adaptive learning. In
this manner, ﬂuctuations may increase the speed of learning and reduce inﬂation persistence. As
a consequence, the costs of disinﬂation may decline further.
21Figure 7: Shocks Accelerate Learning and Perceived Persistence Declines
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Disinflation with Temporary Targets
Gradual Disinflation
Temporary Targets (linear)
Figure 7 shows dynamic simulations with a particular draw of random shocks e. The length of
time shown is 40 rather than 20 years as in the preceding ﬁgures. Figure 7 compares the outcome
under a gradual disinﬂation with a long-run target (dotted red line) to a disinﬂation with linearly-
declining annual targets (dashed green line). The top left panel reports the actual inﬂation rates,
which exhibit some random ﬂuctuations. The annual targets are shown by the black-dotted line.
Two aspects of these stochastic simulations are of particular interest. The middle-left panel
shows that the perceived degree of inﬂation persistence continues to decline even after the disin-
ﬂation process has been completed. It is the policy response to the consequences of unforeseen
shocks that stabilizes inﬂation ﬂuctuations and drives down price setters’ estimates of the persis-
tence parameter, ct. This decline is much more pronounced in the simulation with annual targets.
By year 40 it reaches 0.4 while it is still at 0.6 in the gradual disinﬂation with long-run target.
22The reason is that the structural persistence due to indexation is ultimately much smaller in the
simulation with annual targets. The central bank’s announcement and achievement of these tar-
gets has convinced ﬁrms to switch from backward-looking indexation to using the target rates.
It is noteworthy that the probability st that measures the usefulness of central bank targets for
indexation does not increase as smoothly as in the absence of unforeseeable random shocks. In
Figure 3, lower left panel, the probability st rises rapidly and smoothly above the trigger level in
the simulation with linearly-decline targets. In Figure 7, lower left panel, it moves up and down
a little bit before rising further above the trigger level. This ﬁnding shows that the switch from
backward-looking indexation to the central bank targets is inﬂuenced by the particular series of
shocks.
Of course, Figure 7 only reports the outcomes for a single draw of shocks. The strategy with
temporary inﬂation targets need not always outperform the gradual disinﬂation strategy in terms of
output losses. Toshed further light onthe likely outcomes wesimulate 1000 series ofshocks drawn
from a normal distribution and compute averages across these 1000 simulations. These averages
are reported in Figure 8. We show averages for the gradual disinﬂation with long-run target (red
dotted line), with linearly-declining annual targets (dashed green line), with decelerating targets
(dashed-dotted black line) and with accelerating targets (solid blue line).
The results are quite similar to the simulation without shocks though not the same due to the
nonlinearity resulting from adaptive learning and indexation. The ranking of speeds of disinﬂation
(top left panel) and cumulative output losses (middle left panel) remains unchanged. Theperceived
degree of inﬂation persistence reaches 0.4 for all three types of temporary targets by year 40.
After many more years it converges to a small but positive value consistent with the persistence
implied by the minimum degree of backward-looking indexation under rational expectations. The
increase in the probability st, (lower left panel) is fastest with decelerating targets and slowest
with accelerating targets. As a result, the degree of backward-looking indexation declines most
quickly with decelerating targets and mostslowly withaccelerating targets. Inthe case of agradual
disinﬂation with long-run targets backward-ward looking indexation remains complete.
23Figure 8: Averages over 1000 Simulations
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7 A ”sophisticated” central bank versus one that learns
A ”sophisticated” central bank
Our ﬁndings suggest that the performance of monetary policy could be improved further by
allowing the central bank to observe and exploit the nonlinear dynamics due to adaptive learning
and endogenous indexation, i.e. equations (7), (10) and (11), in the design of dynamically optimal
policy. Gaspar et al (2006) have studied such an optimal policy problem with adaptive learning
but without endogenous indexation. They introduced the label ”sophisticated” for a central bank
that is capable of exploiting learning dynamics. In our model, such a sophisticated central bank
24would solve the following dynamic optimization problem:
Min
xt
Et
 
¥
å
t=1
bt−1(pt −p∗)2+ax2
t
 
(22)
s.t. pt = d1,tpt−1+d2,txt +d3,t
and s.t. equations (7),(8), (10) and (11).
The optimal policy is nonlinear because it takes into account the nonlinearities arising from recur-
sive estimation of the degree of inﬂation persistence, i.e. equations (7) and (8), and endogenous
indexation, i.e. equations (10) and (11).
Following Gaspar et al (2006) the central bank’s choice variable is assumed to be the output
gap and the central bank is assumed to aim at a long-run inﬂation target. An alternative approach,
inspired by our paper, would be to use annual inﬂation targets as the choice variable of the central
bank. A particular choice of temporary target would then automatically imply a given output gap
according to the strict inﬂation targeting policy shown by equation (20).
The optimization problem deﬁned by (22) corresponds to a nonlinear dynamic programming
problem with four state variables: (pt−1,ct−1,St−1,st−1). Numerical approximation of such a
problem is complicated but within reach of current methodology. However, optimal policy design
in this manner relies on rather courageous assumptions regarding the central bank’s knowledge of
private sector expectations formation. The central bank is not only assumed to observe the private
sector’s beliefs, it is also assumed to know the exact learning dynamics. Perhaps, the policy that
could be implemented by such an extremely knowledgeable central bank forms a useful bench-
mark for model-based comparison but it does not represent a strategy that could be implemented
in practice. We propose instead an alternative approach to policy design under uncertainty that can
be pursued under more realistic informational assumptions.
A central bank that learns
Optimal policy design that could be implemented with the information available to central
banks in practice takes recourse to learning. In this case, the central bank would learn about
inﬂation dynamics by recursively estimating the relevant parameters of the reduced form inﬂation
equations (13) or (19). Contrary to the price-setting ﬁrms in our model that were assumed to
simply estimate a regression of inﬂation on its own lag, the central bank can spend more resources
on learning. Certainly, central bank econometricians estimate Phillips curves on a regular basis
that include the effect of policy on inﬂation via the output gap xt.
In the model studied in this paper, central bank learning could be applied to the reduced-form
25inﬂation equation consistent with adaptive learning and endogenous indexation, that is,
pt = d1,tpt−1+d2,txt +d3,t (23)
Following Wieland (2006)10 central bank beliefs regarding the three time-varying parameters may
be summarized by the vector dt = (d1,t,d2,t,d3,t) and associated covariance matrix Sd,t.
Var






d1,t
d2,t
d3,t





 = Sd =



v1
t v12
t v13
t
v12
t v2
t v23
t
v13
t v23
t v3
t


. (24)
The vector of state variables that characterize central bank beliefs contains nine variables, the three
means, three variances and three covariances. Theassociated updating equations forrecursive least
squares with time-varying parameters correspond to:11



d1,t
d2,t
d3,t


 =



d1,t−1
d2,t−1
d3,t−1


+St−1XtF−1(pt −d1,t−1pt−1−d2,t−1xt −d3,t−1)
(25)
Sd,t = Sd,t−1−Sd,t−1XtF−1X′
tSd,t−1+sd where F = XtSd,t−1X′
t +sh
where F refers to the conditional variance of inﬂation.
In contrast to the ”sophisticated” central bank discussed above, the information requirements
for such a learning central bank are much less stringent. Only inﬂation and output observations
are needed. Potential output could be subsumed in the time-varying intercept. Thus, an area
of fruitful future research would be to re-assess the disinﬂation policies in the preceding section
under the assumption that the central bank learns about the time-varying parameters governing the
inﬂation process in this manner. Wieland (2000, 2006) and Beck and Wieland (2002) compute
optimal learning policies for such problems with up to two unknown parameters and compare
their performance to passive learning policies that do not take into account the central bank’s own
updating equations in optimization. At least, policy design under passive learning could be applied
to the policy problem in this paper.
10Other related work on central bank learning that is of interest in this context includes Cogley, Colacito and Sargent
(2005), Ellison (2006), Svensson and Williams (2006) and Wieland (2000a,b).
11For a derivation of the updating equations using Bayes rule or Kalman ﬁlter see Zellner (1971) and Harvey (1992)
respectively.
268 Conclusions and extensions
In this paper, we have shown that inﬂation targeting strategies can lower the costs of disinﬂation
and future inﬂation stabilization. We have explored two channels through which such a reduction
may take place: adaptive learning and endogenous indexation. Arguably, both channels may have
played an important role in Chile’s disinﬂation experience.
If market participants learn adaptively rather than form rational expectations history matters.
As the central bank acts to bring inﬂation under control, market participants will observe the
consequences of these actions and revise their beliefs regarding the degree of inﬂation persistence.
Over time, adaptive learning lowers the cost of disinﬂation. A gradual approach to disinﬂation can
take advantage of this beneﬁcial effect.
Endogenous indexation implies that price-setting ﬁrms are allowed to choose between past
inﬂation and the central bank’s target as index for their pricing rule in periods without Calvo-
style signals to set prices optimally. Firms assess the likelihood that announced inﬂation targets
determine steady-state inﬂation and adjust the indexation of contracts accordingly. A strategy
of announcing and achieving short-term targets for inﬂation is able to inﬂuence the degree of
backward-looking indexation. It implies that ﬁrms are able to observe fairly soon whether the cen-
tral bank acts to meet the targets it proclaims. Following up on words with the appropriate deeds
raises the likelihood that ﬁrms switch from backward-looking indexation to the central bank’s an-
nounced targets. Short-term annual targets that are pursued aggressively help reducing the degree
of indexation more effectively than a strategy with a long-run target that is achieved only gradually.
Our analysis suggests that dynamic general equilibrium models estimated under the assump-
tions of rational expectations and a exogenous, constant degree of backward-looking indexation
may misjudge the costs of disinﬂation in two ways. On the one hand, the assumption of ratio-
nal expectations may overstate the power of the central bank to inﬂuence the costs of disinﬂation
by words alone whether they be announcements or verbal commitments. Learning implies that
announcements need to be followed by action to convince market participants. The resulting re-
duction in inﬂation persistence is inﬂuenced by policy actions as well as economic shocks. The
assumption of exogenous indexation, on the other hand, may lead to model estimates that over-
state the cost of disinﬂation and inﬂation-output tradeoffs. Endogenous reductions in the degree
of backward-looking indexation as inﬂation rates decline to a low level consistent with announced
targets would present the central bank with more favorable trade-offs.
There are a number of interesting and potentially important possible extensions of this re-
search. These extensions concern the optimal design of monetary policy, the formation of expec-
tations, the role of the interest rate, the role of the exchange rate and the degree of openness of the
economy.
With regard to dynamically optimal policy design, two possible approaches have been pro-
posed in section 7 of the paper. It would be of interest to derive the dynamically optimal policy
27that takes into account the nonlinear learning dynamics present in the model. Although such
a policy relies on unrealistic informational assumptions it would form a useful benchmark for
comparison with simpler, practically implementable policies such as the policy with central bank
learning proposed in section 7.
As to the formation of expectations it would be useful to evaluate the implications of alter-
native adaptive learning speciﬁcations (cf. Branch and Evans (2006), Milani (2007)) for the cost
of disinﬂation. Also, it would be interesting to study endogenous indexation under rational ex-
pectations. In this manner, the quantitative effects due to endogenous indexation could be studied
separately from those due to adaptive learning.
The model consider so far is very stylized. The central bank has been assumed to control the
output gap directly. Instead, the transmission from the central bank’s primary policy instrument,
that is the nominal short-term interest rate, and the output gap could be modeled explicitly. In other
words, the model can be extended to include the log-linearized Euler equation of the households,
i.e. the New-Keynesian IS curve. This extension would allow us to pose a host of new questions
regarding the design of interest rate rules and the conditions for stability under learning (see also
Llosa and Tuesta (2007)).
Finally, Chile as well as many other inﬂation targeting countries are small open economies.
During the disinﬂation in Chile favorable shocks to the exchange rate and the terms of trade may
have played an important role in cushioning the economy. These effects could be examined by
extending the analysis of learning and endogenous indexation conducted in this paper to a small
open economy. In an open economy further practical questions arise such as whether to target
domestic inﬂation or CPI inﬂation and how to account for the exchange rate in interest rate policy.
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